The New Energy Geopolitics: Oil, Gas, and Critical Minerals

The global energy transition is not diminishing resource competition but fundamentally reshaping it, as nations that once wielded influence through oil and gas reserves now find themselves scrambling to secure supplies of lithium, cobalt, and rare earth elements concentrated in a handful of politically volatile regions. Control over critical mineral supply chains has emerged as the defining geopolitical battleground of the coming decades, redrawing alliances and intensifying rivalries between Washington, Beijing, and a new generation of resource-rich states demanding greater leverage over the terms of extraction.โ€ฆ

Sophie Aldridge

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Sophie Aldridge

Published

24 Sept 2026

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5 min

The New Energy Geopolitics: Oil, Gas, and Critical Minerals

The New Energy Geopolitics: Oil, Gas, and Critical Minerals

When the Democratic Republic of Congo filed a complaint against Apple in late 2024, alleging the tech giant's supply chain relied on illegally mined cobalt and tin, it signalled something far larger than a corporate controversy. It confirmed that the fight over critical minerals has become as strategically consequential as the contest over oil was in the twentieth century. In 2026, energy geopolitics is no longer a single-commodity game. It is a multi-dimensional contest spanning hydrocarbons, rare earths, lithium, and cobalt โ€” and the winners will be those who control not just extraction, but refining, processing, and the diplomatic architecture around these resources.

For sovereign wealth funds, family offices, and private capital allocators across the Gulf and emerging markets, the implications are hard to overstate. Asset allocation strategies built around legacy energy assumptions are being rewritten in real time, and the capital flows are staggering in scale.

OPEC+ and the Enduring Power of Hydrocarbons

Reports of oil's demise remain premature. Global oil demand reached approximately 104 million barrels per day in early 2026, according to the International Energy Agency, with growth driven overwhelmingly by petrochemical feedstocks and aviation fuel in Asia. Saudi Aramco, which posted net income of $106 billion in 2024, continues to invest heavily in sustaining production capacity at 12 million barrels per day, even as the Kingdom pursues its downstream diversification strategy through projects like the $10 billion Amiral complex in Jubail.

The OPEC+ alliance, while fraying at the margins โ€” Kazakhstan and Iraq have repeatedly exceeded their quotas โ€” remains the single most powerful price-setting mechanism in global commodities. Saudi Arabia's willingness to absorb voluntary production cuts of roughly one million barrels per day through much of 2024 and 2025 demonstrated Riyadh's resolve to defend a price floor near $80 per barrel, the approximate fiscal breakeven the Kingdom requires to fund Vision 2030 spending.

For Gulf-based family offices and sovereign investors, the calculus is straightforward but unforgiving: hydrocarbon revenues remain the primary engine of national wealth, yet the window for monetising these reserves at peak value is narrowing. Abu Dhabi's ADNOC has responded by accelerating its international expansion, acquiring a 24.9% stake in Austrian chemicals group Borealis and investing in LNG capacity through partnerships across Asia. The strategy is vertical integration at scale โ€” owning molecules from wellhead to end product.

The Critical Minerals Scramble

China refines approximately 70% of the world's lithium, 68% of its cobalt, and over 90% of rare earth elements. That dominance, built methodically over two decades of state-directed investment, represents perhaps the most significant supply chain vulnerability facing Western economies. Beijing's decision in late 2024 to impose export restrictions on germanium, gallium, and antimony โ€” metals essential for semiconductors, defence systems, and solar panels โ€” was a stark demonstration of this leverage. Not a subtle one, either.

The Western response has been fragmented but accelerating. The US Inflation Reduction Act's critical minerals provisions have channelled billions toward domestic and allied-nation supply chains. Australia's Lynas Rare Earths, the largest non-Chinese producer, secured a $258 million US Department of Defense contract to build processing capacity in Texas. Indonesia, meanwhile, played a shrewder hand: the government's ban on raw nickel ore exports successfully attracted over $15 billion in Chinese and South Korean smelting investment, transforming the archipelago into the world's dominant nickel processing hub.

Private wealth is following these flows. Several prominent Gulf family offices have taken significant positions in lithium projects across Argentina's "Lithium Triangle," where companies like Arcadium Lithium (formed from the Allkem-Livent merger) and Rio Tinto's Rincon project are ramping production. Argentina's President Milei has aggressively courted foreign mining investment through deregulation and tax incentives, positioning the country as a counterweight to Chile's more restrictive royalty regime.

The Gulf's Strategic Pivot

Saudi Arabia's $2.6 billion investment in Vale's base metals unit, announced in 2023, was an early signal. By 2026, the Kingdom's mineral strategy has become a central pillar of economic diversification. Ma'aden, the Saudi mining champion, is developing the Mansourah-Massarah gold mine and expanding its phosphate and aluminium operations. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has publicly stated the ambition to generate $75 billion annually from the mining sector by 2035 โ€” a figure that would make it a meaningful complement to petroleum revenues. That is a significant shift.

The UAE has pursued a parallel but distinct approach, positioning itself as a trading and financing hub for critical minerals rather than a primary extractor. Dubai Multi Commodities Centre has aggressively courted rare earth and battery metals traders, while Mubadala has deployed capital into downstream battery manufacturing through investments in companies operating across the European and North American electric vehicle supply chain. Abu Dhabi's International Holding Company, controlled by Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed, has built a sprawling portfolio that touches mining, metals trading, and energy infrastructure across Africa and Central Asia. Few outside the region have noticed the full scope of it.

Africa: The Contested Frontier

The continent holds roughly 30% of the world's known mineral reserves, including dominant shares of cobalt, platinum group metals, manganese, and chromium. Yet African nations have historically captured a fraction of the value generated from these resources. That dynamic is shifting โ€” sometimes violently. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, all under military governments that have distanced themselves from France, have renegotiated or revoked mining concessions held by Western firms, often redirecting access toward Russian and Chinese entities.

More constructive models are emerging elsewhere. Botswana's renegotiation of its diamond partnership with De Beers in 2024, securing a larger share of rough diamond sales for the state-owned Okavango Diamond Company, has been widely cited as a template for resource nationalism done intelligently. Morocco's OCP Group, the world's largest phosphate producer, is leveraging its near-monopoly position to build a vertically integrated fertiliser and clean energy conglomerate, attracting investment from the International Finance Corporation and multiple Gulf sovereign funds.

Capital Allocation in an Age of Resource Competition

For sophisticated private investors, the new energy geopolitics demands a portfolio construction approach that accounts for supply chain risk, jurisdictional stability, and the accelerating competition between great powers over resource access. Pure-play upstream oil and gas exposure remains profitable but carries increasing political risk โ€” from windfall taxes in Europe to stranded asset concerns in long-duration projects. Critical minerals offer compelling growth trajectories but come with concentration risk, price volatility, and governance challenges in many producing jurisdictions.

The smartest capital is pursuing optionality: stakes in midstream processing and refining, where margins are more defensible; positions in jurisdictions actively courting foreign investment with credible legal frameworks; and exposure to the infrastructure โ€” ports, rail, power generation โ€” that underpins resource extraction in frontier markets. Firms like Trafigura, Glencore, and the trading arms of Gulf national oil companies are generating outsized returns precisely because they sit at the intersection of physical commodity flows and geopolitical risk management.

The energy transition has not simplified geopolitics. It has added layers of complexity that reward informed, patient capital โ€” and punish those still running a twentieth-century playbook.

Sophie Aldridge

Written by

Sophie Aldridge

Global Economics Editor ยท Geopolitics

Sophie spent a decade advising governments on trade policy before deciding the story was more interesting than the memo. She covers global economics, geopolitics, and the power transitions reshaping emerging markets. Sharpest on sanctions, supply chains, and the politics behind the price of everything. Based in Washington, D.C. Reach out at sophie.aldridge@theplatinumcapital.com.